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Stories of American Heroes - Brought to you from the "Home of Heroes" - Pueblo, Colorado |
Valiente!
The Sinking of the Merrimac
The hide-and-seek action that ultimately ended with the naval battle at Santiago two months into the Spanish-American War started with the initial declarations of war by Spain on April 21st and the United States on April 25th. With the opening declaration of hostilities, Spain moved swiftly to protect its citizens in the Caribbean. Beyond the fleet at Manila, the remainder of the once mighty Spanish Armada was located in Spain and off the Cape Verde Islands.
The flotilla at home was undergoing maintenance and repair at Cadiz, Spain. These ships would not be battle-ready for at least a month, so defense of the Caribbean was delegated to the Cape Verde flotilla.
Rear Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete was surprised and dismayed when he received orders to lift anchor at his haven in the Cape Verde Islands off the coast of West Africa, and proceed to the West Indies (Caribbean). "This is a very risky adventure, for the defeat of my ships in the Caribbean could result in great danger for the Canaries, and perhaps the bombardment of our coastal cities," he wired back to Madrid. "Any division of our fleet, and any separation from European seas, is a strategic mistake."
Admiral Cervera was a respected naval officer and not a man fearful to do his job, but the orders sending his flotilla to meet the American warships in the Caribbean gave him an ominous foreboding of disaster. When his appeal to Madrid was denied, he dutifully hoisted anchor on April 29th and set a course for Cuba. Before his departure he registered his concern one more time, wiring Madrid that, "Nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of our flotilla. With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice, but I cannot understand the (Spanish) navy's decision."
As quickly as the media in the United States heard the news that Admiral Cervera's ships were heading west, the yellow journalists worked up a frenzy of fear and dread, proclaiming in large headlines that the Spanish Armada was on its way and would bombard American coastal cities within two weeks. Despite the fact that the "Armada" actually consisted of only four outdated cruisers and three smaller torpedo boats, the news reports quickly sensationalized the coming conflict to epic proportions. The panic and public outcry that followed prompted immediate naval action at home. Even as Admiral Dewey was enroute from China to Manila Bay for the infamous battle of May 1st, preparations were underway to move the US Navy's Atlantic fleet to the Caribbean.
Navy Secretary John D. Long was convinced Cervera and his ships would most likely head for San Juan, Puerto Rico on the eastern border of the Caribbean, though he left open the possibility that the Spanish Admiral might instead elect to steam straight for Havana. The Atlantic fleet was under the command of US Rear Admiral William T. Sampson, a worthy opponent for Admiral Cervera. Sampson proposed quick strikes, first to capture Havana, then a rapid voyage to shell and capture San Juan. He reasoned that such a move would deny the Spanish flotilla any safe haven when they arrived in the Caribbean, projected by Secretary Long to be on or near the date of May 10th.
Once again however, it was the media that would dictate the order of battle. Public panic and the cry for protection of American coastal waters prompted Long to split Sampson's fleet, pulling the battleships Texas, Massachusetts and Iowa back to Hampton Roads, Virginia as a "flying squadron" under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley. Sampson's other warships were limited to blockade duties around the island of Cuba, further stripped by the transfer of two of his cruisers to support efforts of a naval militia under Commodore John Howell that was assigned routine patrol duty of the Atlantic coastline from Maine to Florida.
Those first two weeks of the Spanish-American War were filled with frustration and boredom in the Caribbean. The inaction was further compounded when the sailors of Sampson's fleet began hearing the glorious reports of the victory at Manila Bay, half a world away. When Cervera's flotilla had not arrived in the West Indies by Secretary Long's predicted date of May 10th, the American commander, his officers, and his men were both disappointed and further frustrated. It was this continuing erosion of morale that prompted Captain McCalla of the Marblehead to engage his ships in the cable-cutting operation of May 11th, and that also prompted Captain Todd to send his vessels into Cardenas Harbor that same day. Both efforts had broken the boredom, but both had also ended in near disaster.
Feeling the same frustration as his men and with the Spanish flotilla proving to be a "no show", Admiral Sampson chose to commence a reconnaissance of Puerto Rico.
The small island less than 3,500 square miles was located on the eastern fringe of the Caribbean, and sat between Cuba and the expected flotilla from Cape Verde. Claimed for Spain by Christopher Columbus and colonized by Ponce De Leon, the people of Puerto Rico had begun requesting independence from Spanish rule. In 1897 Madrid granted the people of Puerto Rico a limited degree of self-government, but resisted all demands for independence.
When Admiral Sampson began his reconnaissance in May 1898, the Spanish had three forts on the long, narrow island. On May 12th Sampson entered the harbor at San Juan on the western edge of the island. His fleet consisted of seven warships, a torpedo boat, a tug and supporting supply vessels. Carefully the fleet maneuvered around the sunken hulks of two ships in the harbor at San Juan, and proceeded towards the forts deep inside. Sampson had hoped to find Cervera's ships at anchor inside the calm waters, but all he found as he circled the harbor three times, were three small gunboats.
As the fleet passed the enemy forts inside the harbor at San Juan, Admiral Sampson opened fire. In the brief battles that followed, Sampson's ships neither rendered or received any major damage. As the ships withdrew however, an enemy shell exploded on the New York, killing two men and wounding seven. Discouraged, disappointed and now running low on fuel, Admiral Sampson directed his fleet to return to Key West for resupply and repairs.
Steaming for Key West the day following his bombardment of San Juan, Admiral Sampson received some disappointing news. The U.S.S. Solace caught up to the American ships with a report that Admiral Cervera's fleet had returned to Cadiz, in Spain. As the bulk of the American naval presence departed the Antilles, on May 14th the Spanish gunboats Conde de Venadito and Nueva Espana made a brief and generally ineffective sortie out of Havana. The following day the U.S.S. Porter caught up to Admiral Sampson bearing surprising news. The report he'd received two days earlier from the Solace was in error. Admiral Cervera's squadron had indeed arrived in the Antilles, and had been spotted at Martinique on May 12th, then in Curaco on the 14th. Also, on May 13th Commodore Schley's flying squadron had left Hampton Roads for Cuba.
The news, rather than raising the excitement level, served only to add to the frustration. Low on fuel, Sampson had no choice but to continue his course for Key West. In the two weeks that followed, events moved rapidly in the Caribbean and the commander of the Atlantic fleet chaffed at the bit to return and meet the enemy. On May 18th the New York arrived in Key West and Admiral Sampson met briefly with Commodore Schley and ordered him to immediately steam for the harbor at Cienfuegos, the place he deemed the most likely destination of Admiral Cervera's flotilla.
On the morning of May 19th Admiral Cervera's ships reached the entrance to Santiago harbor at the southeast end of the island of Cuba. It was the same day that the remainder of Admiral Sampson's ships finally arrived in Key West. The following day the Navy Department notified Admiral Sampson that in all probability, reports of Cervera's fleet arriving at Santiago were correct. It was anticipated that the enemy ships would proceed immediately for Cienfuegos, 300 miles and a single day's travel, further to the west. Based upon the location of Sampson's ships in Key West and the route of the flying squadron under Schley, Cervera would be unmolested in this effort.
It wasn't until midnight on May 21st that the flying squadron reached Cienfuegos, Commodore Schley's warships riding out the darkness of night from a distance of about 20 miles. With daylight however, his ships cruised closer to Cienfuegos, hoping to draw fire and confirm the presence of the enemy fleet. They met only silence. Somehow, once again, the Spanish fleet had eluded the Americans. Meanwhile Admiral Sampson had returned to the Antilles, taking a blockading position in his flagship northwest of Cuba. Here he sent a message to Commodore Schley to proceed with his flying squadron to Santiago, where Sampson expected the squadron to arrive on May 24th. The search for the enemy fleet was still underway in the cat-and-mouse game that was now nearly a month old.
In fact, Admiral Cervera had taken his ships inside the narrow confines of Santiago Harbor. While Cienfuegos may have been preferable, his ships were low on coal, and the 300-mile voyage to Cienfuegos had to be postponed. That action not only sheltered the Spanish flotilla, but left the Americans wondering where the mighty armada of the Spanish Empire had vanished.
Commodore Schley didn't leave immediately for Santiago however, remaining outside Cienfuegos where he was joined at noon on May 22nd by the Iowa and the Dupont. That afternoon he again sent his ships in closer to Cienfuegos, and this time he believed he could see the tops of an enemy man-of-war. Dupont was sent closer to reconnoiter and reported seeing several ships inside the harbor. Schley initially believed he had found Admiral Cervera. While continuing this blockade of Cienfuegos, the flying squadron was joined by additional American ships including the Castine, an armed yacht, and the aging collier Merrimac. On the evening of May 24th Schley ordered the Castine to take up position in front of the harbor at Cienfuegos, though he was now convinced the Spanish fleet was not to be found nearby. The Dupont was returned to Key West, and the flying squadron proceeded towards the opening to Santiago harbor 300 miles away. Schley's squadron included the Brooklyn, Iowa, Texas, Massachusetts, Marblehead, Vixen, Hawk, Eagle and Merrimac.
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On the day Schley set course for Santiago, he also sent a message to Admiral Sampson indicating there was no sign of the Spanish flotilla at Cienfuegos, and that his ships did not have enough coal to maintain a blockade at the opening to Santiago harbor. Unaware that the enemy warships were hidden within the narrow harbor, on May 26th Schley left the St. Paul to watch the harbor, then set his squadron on a course for Key West. Enroute and about 40 miles from Santiago, the Merrimac broke down so completely it had to be taken under tow by the Yale.
In the meantime, Admiral Sampson learned that in fact, the enemy warships had taken anchor inside Santiago Harbor, and was determined to end the chase. He returned to Key West to obtain permission to personally take command of the blockade at Santiago Harbor and, he hoped, subsequently destroy Admiral Cervera's squadron. His request granted, on May 29th Admiral Sampson departed Key West for Santiago de Cuba in his flagship U.S.S. New York. Joining his flotilla, in addition to the Mayflower and the Porter, was the newly arrived U.S.S. Oregon. (The powerful battleship Oregon, under the command of Captain Charles Clark, had left port in San Francisco on March 12th to travel around the Cape and arrive in Florida after a 14,700 nautical mile, 71-day race against time. The length of time it took the battleship to move from coast to coast would give rise to ideas for a shorter route, perhaps a canal in the narrow finger that joined the continents of North and South America.)
The Harbor of Santiago de Cuba is a long, narrow finger of calm tropical sea that reaches inland nearly 10 miles. The shoreline is dotted with hidden coves and inlets, the
perfect hiding place for small gunboats to protect any ships anchored inside. Access to the harbor from the sea could only be accomplished through a narrow inlet, only 200 yards across. The inlet itself was protected from the west by the Socapa Battery and on the eastern shore by the Morro Castle.
Before leaving Key West, Admiral Sampson had conferred with Captains Converse and Fogler and Commodore Watson in efforts to format a plan of action. Unlike the harbor at Manila, there was no hope for American warships to enter and destroy the armada. By chance, more than by design, Cervera's ships were stuck in a harbor that offered far more protection from attack than had they been able to continue to Cienfuegos. The culmination of these conferences was that, if the American ships couldn't get in to destroy Admiral Cervera, then they would pen his ships inside. There were discussions about loading several small schooners with brick and rocks and then sinking them in the narrow inlet. Captain Converse thought of the broken down, 333-foot Merrimac and suggested that it might provide a greater sunken barrier than several schooners.
As Admiral Sampson steamed towards the enemy in his flag ship, the plan of action had been determined. All that remained was to figure out a way to accomplish it. The mission would be a dangerous one, sailing the large ship directly into the fire of enemy cannon, then sending it to the bottom of the sea. Perhaps the HOW would be far more difficult than the WHAT, and even more critical than either perhaps,
was the WHO!
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Later that afternoon a small Spanish tug left the harbor under a flag of truce. Steaming next to the New York, it halted while Cervera's chief-of-staff, Captain Bustamente delivered a message from the Spanish admiral that Richmond Hobson and all of his men were safe. It was a dramatic example of compassion in time of war, an enemy commander's show of respect for true heroism even when exhibited by his enemy. The message delivered, Bustamente returned to Santiago with provisions of clothing and a small amount of money for the captured sailors.
Initially the 8 prisoners were confined at Morro Castle, then later moved into the city of Santiago De Cuba. Three weeks later Daniel Montague became very sick and was moved to a hospital. (Though he recovered, the tropical illness contracted during his captivity, led to ill health in the years to follow and eventually contributed to his death in 1912.) On July 6th, after a desperate battle during which Admiral Cevera would attempt to escape the harbor with his fleet, all eight volunteers from the ill-fated Merrimac sinking were paroled in a prisoner exchange.
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A Splendid Little War |
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